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Abstract 
This study attempts to fill a void in the literature by examining education-occupation 
mismatches in Egypt. Using the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) 2006 and Egypt 
Labor Market Survey (ELMS) 1998, this paper investigates whether the empirical evidences 
of studies on over-education and under-education carry over to the private sector of the 
Egyptian labor market; evaluates the incidence and magnitude of the education-occupation 
mismatch by gender and by occupational categories; and determines whether the incidence of 
educational mismatches has increased over time. The main findings are as follows: there is 
evidence of an education-occupation mismatch in the Egyptian private sector. The incidence 
has declined from 51% to 42% during the eight year period, and males are more likely to be 
mismatched than females.  The Egyptian labor market has witnessed a drop in the percentage 
of overeducated workers at the expense of an expansion in the share of under-educated 
workers. Empirical findings do not support the main stream literature. Returns to over-
education for white collar and blue collar males are higher than those of adequately educated 
males and are greater in 2006 than in 1998. Females in white collar jobs, both over and 
undereducated, received higher returns than adequately educated females in 1998, but returns 
to over-education were higher and returns to under-education were lower than adequate 
education in 2006. Females in blue collar jobs are being penalized if they are inadequately 
matched, especially in 2006, and are rewarded less than males. These findings support the job 
competition model in a labor market with an imperfect information system whereby 
employers use education as an indicator of the cost of investing in job training. Workers, on 
the other hand, may accept these jobs while competing for a job. 
 
 
 
 
صخلم 
لأمت نأ ةقرولا هذه لواحت  ةمثلاتاباتكلا يف ٍغارف نعرصم يف ةفيظولا ةيعونو ميلعتلا ةيعون نيب قباطتلا مدع  . مادختسابف
 ماعل رصم يف لمعلا قوس حسم ةحول2006 ماعل يرصملا لمعلا قوس حسمو 1998 له نيبتت نأ ةقرولا هذه لواحت ،
تناآ لمعلا قوس يف صاخلا عاطقلا ىلع بحسنت يندتملا ميلعتلاو يلاعلا ميلعتلا ىلع ةذفنملا تاساردلل ةيبيرجتلا ةلدلأا 
 تائفلا بسح كلذآو سنجلا بسح ةفيظولا عونو ميلعتلا عون نيب توافتلا كلذ ثودح لدعم ريدقتب موقت لهو يرصملا
لا رورم عم توافتلا كلذ ثودح داز له ددحتو ةلماعلانمز. يلي اميف جئاتنلا مهأ تلثمتو : نيب مغانتلا مادعنا ىلع ٍليلد ةمث
يرصملا صاخلا عاطقلا يف ةفيظولا ةيعونو ميلعتلا ةيعون . نم كلذ ثودح لدعم ضفخنا دقو51 % يلإ42 % للاخ
اب مهميلعت ةعيبطو قستت لا فئاظو لغشل ًاضرعت رثآأ روآذلا ناآو ةساردلا اهتطغ يتلا تاونس نامثلاثانلإاب ةنراقمل. 
و يضفخنم لامعلا بيصن يف عسوتلا ريظن يلاعلا ميلعتلا يوذ نم لامعلا ةبسن يف ًاضافخنا يرصملا لمعلا قوس دهش
ميلعتلا .صوصخلا اذه يف ةدئاسلا تاباتكلا ةيوربخلا جئاتنلا دضعت لاو.   روآذلا نم يلاعلا ميلعتلا يوذل دئاوعلا تناآو
لاو ءاضيبلا تاقايلا باحصأ هذه تناآو ميلعتلا نم هب سأب لا ٍردق ىلع نيلصاحلا روآذلا دئاوع نم ىلعأ ءاقرزلا تاقاي
 ماعلا يف دئاوعلا2006 ماعلا يف اهنم ربآأ 1998.  نعتمت ءاوس ءاضيبلا تاقايلا عباط نم فئاظو نلغشي يئلالا ثانلإا امأ
 ماعلا يف نلصح نهنإف ٍضفخنم وأ ٍلاع ٍميلعتب1998 ٍتادئاع ىلع  ىلع تلاصاحلا ثانلإا اهيلع تلصح يتلا كلت نم ربآأ
 تادئاع تناآو طسوتملا ميلعتلا تاوذ تادئاع نم ربآأ تناآ يلاعلا ميلعتلا تاوذل تادئاعلا نكلو ،ميلعتلا نم هب سأب لا ٍردق
 ماعلا يف طسوتملا ميلعتلا تاوذ تادئاع نم لقأ ضفخنملا ميلعتلا تاوذ2006. ئاظو يف ثانلإا بقاعتو ءاقرزلا تاقايلا ف
 ماعلا يف اميس لا نهبسانت لا نآامأ يف نعضو لاح يف2006روآذلا ظح نع اهنم نهظح لق دقف ةأفاكملا ثيح نم امأ ،. 
و بابرأ دمعي ثيح ٍلماآ ٍيتامولعم ٍماظنب عتمتي لا ٍلمع قوس يف ةيفيظولا ةسفانملا جذومن معدل ةمهم جئاتنلا هذه ربتعت
ختسا ىلإ هيف لامعلأاينهملا بيردتلا يف رامثتسلإا ةفلكت رادقم ىلع ٍرشؤمآ ميلعتلا عون ماد. و نإف رخلآا بناجلا ىلع
ةفيظو نع مهثحب ضرعم يف فئاظولا هذه نولبقي امبر لامعلا. 
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1. Introduction 
It is sufficiently established that the distribution of income in an economy is strongly related 
to the amount of education people have accumulated. Generally speaking, more schooling 
means a higher lifetime income. Human capital theory assumes that individuals are paid the 
value of their marginal product which is determined by their human capital (education, 
training, experience, etc.), rather than the characteristics of their job (Becker, 1975). Firms on 
the other hand, are assumed to fully utilize their work force and to adapt their production 
technology in response to changes in the relative supply of skilled labor. This suggests that 
over-education or under-education are both primarily the result of an inefficiency in the labor 
market. However, some economists question whether firms can easily adapt their production 
techniques to changes in the relative input prices, including the price of labor (Duncan and 
Hoffman, 1981; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988; Rumberger, 1987). If firms cannot adapt 
quickly, then an individual’s productivity, and hence their earnings, may depend on their job 
attributes. In which case, job characteristics (particularly educational requirements) need to 
be included as explanatory variables in any model of earnings, and it is quite possible the 
return to required education may exceed the return to any surplus education.  
The recent literature on over-education and under-education provides a useful way of 
considering demand-side characteristics in the study of wage determination. The basic 
premise of this literature is that there is an assigned or required level of education for every 
occupation, representing the adequate level of education necessary to perform that 
occupation. Workers with education exceeding that level are considered overeducated, 
whereas those with lower levels are regarded as undereducated. (e.g., Cohn & Kahn, 1995; 
Duncan & Hoffman, 1981; Groot & Maassen van den Brink, 2000; Hartog, 2000; Hartog & 
Oosterbook, 1988; Hersch, 1991; Robst, 1995; and Sicherman, 1991). Empirical literature 
focusing mainly on industrialized economies and using the over and under- education 
approach has shown that returns to required education are significantly greater than returns to 
actual education.  
This paper is the first to examine the impact of the education-occupation mismatch on wages 
in Egypt. Quinn and Rubb (2006) initiated such studies for developing countries (namely 
Mexico). Given the differences between developed and developing countries, it is likely that 
the findings of the over/under-education literature may not hold true in less advanced 
economies. This paper provides original evidence into the current status and historical trend 
of the education-occupation mismatch and its effect on wages, and suggests policy 
implications consistent with the results.  
The research presented in this paper is not intended to justify the existence, or to discuss 
causes of, over/under- education in Egypt. Rather, this paper explores whether the empirical 
evidence of studies on over-education and under-education carry over to the Egyptian labor 
market. In particular, the purpose of this paper is to: 
1. Evaluate the incidence and magnitude of the education-occupation mismatch, and 
test evidence against competing models of education surplus. 
2. Determine whether the incidence of educational mismatches has increased over time 
(by comparing two points in time: 1998 and 2006). 
3. Evaluate gender differences in education-occupation mismatch and the effect on 
wages  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a brief overview of the 
education-occupation mismatch literature. Section III details the data and methodology used 
in this study, as well as presents descriptive summaries on the extent of over-education and 
under-education in the Egyptian labor market. Results from the estimation of the modified 
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earnings functions, and gender differences are presented in Section IV, and Section V 
concludes with a summary and policy implications. 
2. A Brief Review of the Literature 
Tinbergen (1956) is credited for the early introduction of the over-education concept in labor 
markets literature, within the context of income inequality.  Tinbergen believes that 
differences in wages are due to a race between supply and demand involving educated labor. 
In this framework, Tinbergen argues that advances in technology are normally accompanied 
by increased demand on high skilled, highly educated labor. If such demand persists, changes 
in technology shifts the demand in favor of high educated workers, and if there is low 
elasticity of substitution among workers of different education levels, wages of highly 
educated workers will increase relative to those less educated, and income inequality will 
widen. 
There are several — not necessarily mutually exclusive — theories in the literature 
explaining over-education, accommodated by the human capital theory. To begin with, the 
human capital of a worker may be obtained by forms other than formal schooling (i.e. 
experience or on the job training). Workers, especially the young, may compensate for lack 
of required human capital by settling for a low-level job as a step towards investing in 
training or gaining experience. Several studies have confirmed this phenomenon (Alba-
Ramirez, 1993; Groot & Maasen van den Brink, 2000; and Cohn and Ng 2000). Groot (1996) 
and Sicherman (1991) found that over-education is considered a part of career mobility where 
overeducated, young workers try different jobs until they find the matching one. 
One interpretation of over-education upholds a job competition model in a labor market 
dominated by imperfect information (Thurow, 1975), whereby employers use education as an 
indicator of the cost of investing in job training. According to this view, employers prefer to 
hire people with more education, or from reputable schools, at the prevailing wage rate. 
Either because they are (or are believed to be) more productive, thus employers save on 
training costs, or simply because employers prefer to associate with the better educated. 
Additional schooling beyond that required for the job, as explained by Rumberger (1987), is 
not always rewarded. While additional schooling is not completely unproductive, jobs 
constrain the ability of workers to fully utilize the skills and capabilities they acquired in 
school. Workers, on the other hand, may accept these jobs while competing for another job. 
Lindahl & Regnér (2005) show that the wage premium for tertiary education in Sweden 
depends on the university at which the degree was obtained. 
A variant of this group is advanced by Spence (1973) with the screening hypothesis, whereby 
in a labor market with imperfect information, employers use education as a mean of job 
screening. In the context of the screening hypothesis, it is worth pointing out the bumping 
model, promoted by Fields (1972). The model rests on the assumption that both rigid wages 
and educational screening are salient features of the labor market, particularly in developing 
countries. The screening feature of this argument implies that the rate of return to education 
below a certain number of years of education is low, whereas above that critical level, the rate 
of return in quite high. Therefore, there is a strong incentive among potential workers to 
invest in education to surpass that critical level. This incentive persists as long as the rate of 
return to education at the higher level does not fall1. Over time, employers respond to the 
excess supply by raising the minimum educational requirements for these jobs. So, the more 
highly educated job seekers are able to secure employment more easily than the less 
educated. Because there is no waiting, the expected returns to education do not fall, even if 
                                                                          
1 An explanation that is consistent with the persistent high levels of unemployment among educated workers in 
Egypt. 
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the actual wage rate in the new job is lower. Eventually, educated workers push less educated 
ones out of these jobs. The signaling or screening theorists claim that any increase in human 
capital is always absorbed by demand. In other words, over-education can exist in this 
imperfect labor market, and ultimately workers compete for jobs not for wages.  
Another interpretation is provided by the search theory, in which over-education is a result of 
the cost of search by either employee or employer. With imperfect information, a poor 
mismatch occurs where an over qualified worker is matched with a lower level job. In this 
scenario, the worker is expected to leave the job shortly after, and so over-education is a 
temporary state. Conversely, an undereducated worker in a higher level job may have an 
incentive to stay longer. Proponents of this view argue that the firm may not replace the 
worker to save on labor recruitment or on the job training costs. Empirical studies 
documented that the probability of over-education is lower with experience, whereas the 
probability of under-education increases with experience (Hartog, 2000; Sloane et al., 1999).  
A further explanation of over-education is shown in the assignment literature, where in a 
dynamic world, with imperfect information, workers and jobs mismatches are possible, and 
may persist for a long time (Sattinger, 1993, and Sloane et al., 1999). In this framework, i.e. 
the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs, if the education system 
graduates an excess supply of a certain level of education in comparison to demand, 
employers may employ overeducated workers. Conversely, when demand for a certain level 
of education exceeds supply, qualifications other than formal education must make up for the 
difference, and hence undereducated workers are employed. 
Finally, the neo-classical model of household specialization has been used to explain gender 
differences in over-education. Frank (1978) argues that because men are assumed to earn 
more than women (women have shorter and interrupted employment), couples, when 
choosing where to live, will maximize their utilities (income) by giving priority to finding the 
best job for the husband, though empirical evidences are mixed in this regard. Whereas 
McGoldrick & Robst (1996), Battu et al. (2000) fail to support it, Büchel et al. (2000) 
confirmed a significant evidence. Other studies found that workers who have experienced a 
career interruption (such as women), are more likely to be in jobs for which they are 
overeducated. 
Rubb (2003), surveying studies from different countries, found three uniform findings: The 
returns to required education are higher than the returns to actual schooling. Years of over-
education are less rewarded than years of required education. Years of under-education are 
rewarded less than years of required education in similar jobs, but more than required 
education in jobs with lower level of required education.  
3. Data Source and Methodology 
The empirical analysis is based on the recent Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 2006 
(ELMPS 06), which is a follow-up survey to the Egypt Labor Market Survey 1998 (ELMS 
98), that was carried out by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with 
CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics).  ELMS 98 was 
administered on a nationally-representative sample of 4,816 households. ELMPS 06 is the 
second round of a periodic longitudinal survey that tracks the labor market and demographic 
characteristics of the households interviewed in 1998, in addition to a refresher sample of 
households.  The ELMPS 06 sample consists of a total of 8,349 households. Empirical 
analysis is carried out on non-agriculture, private sector, out of school, currently in the labor 
force, wage workers ages 15 to 64.  
In the literature of over-education, the number of years of over-education is inserted as a 
separate variable into a human capital earnings function. It is expected to see different rates 
 5
of return to over, under and adequate education.  A straightforward way is to estimate an 
earnings function in which an individual's actual educational attainment is decomposed into 
the number of years of education required for the job and any years of surplus or deficit 
education. By comparing the current schooling level of a worker with the level of education 
required for the job at which the worker performs, a measure of “mismatch” or “over-
education” vs. “under-education” is created. The primary interest is in differences between 
the estimated coefficients on required education and those for years of surplus or deficit 
education. If productivity levels and wages on jobs are inflexible, then the estimated 
coefficients for both surplus and deficit education should be zero. If, however, productivity 
levels on the job are more irregular, and if worker productivity is positively related to 
education level without regard for minimal requirements, then we would expect a positive 
coefficient on years of surplus education and a negative one on years of deficit education. 
Using the modified model of human capital earnings function introduced by Mincer (1974), 
pay differences can be explained by differences in workers’ endowments of human capital in 
addition to other explanatory variables, as follows:  
LnW = β0 + β1E + β2EXP + β3EXP2 +β4X + u      (1) 
Where LnW is the log of real hourly wages, E is a measure of education, EXP is experience 
in years, EXP2 is experience squared, X is a vector of variables reflecting worker and job 
characteristics that may influence the wage level, such as region of residence, marital status 
and firm size, and u is a random disturbance term. The specification is shown logarithmically 
in order for the regressors to be interpreted in terms of marginal effects, in which case the 
index β is interpreted as the rate of returns to schooling. The education variable is a 
categorical variable taking the values 6, 9, 12, 16 and 18 for primary, preparatory, high 
school, university, and above university degrees respectively. 
To examine the effects of over and under-education on earnings, following Duncan and 
Hoffman (1981)2, Hartog (2000), Bauer (2000), and Voon and Miller (2005), the education 
variable (E) is decomposed into three parts: Er , Eo, and Eu, where Er is years of schooling 
required by the job, Eo is number of years of over-education — a positive variable if attained 
education minus required education is positive, and zero otherwise  — and Eu is number of 
years of under-education — a positive variable if required education minus attained education 
is positive, and zero otherwise.  
In other words:  
E = Er + Eo - Eu          (2) 
Where:  
 
 
 
 
 
Following from (1) and (2), according to Hartog (2000), the modified earnings function in (1) 
incorporate these additional measures as follows: 
LnW = β0 + β1Er + β2Eo + β3Eu + β4EXP + β5EXP2 +β6X + u    (3) 
                                                                          
2 Duncan and Hoffman's model was replicated for the Dutch labor market by Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988) and 
for the Spanish labor market by Alba-Ramerez (1993). 
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In the case where wages are determined by the required level of education, β2 and β3 will be 
zero will be zero; i.e. rewards to years in excess of or below the required level of education 
for a particular job would be zero. If, however productivity is positively related to education 
level, then we would expect a positive coefficient on years of surplus education and a 
negative one on years of deficit education. 
Hartog (2000) offered a review on a number of methods used to determine educational 
requirements. As the choice among these procedures3 is determined by data availability, the 
realized match method is used. A measurement of job requirements is derived from the actual 
educational attainments of all workers. Required years of terminated certification (rather than 
the highest year of school attendance), is employed as a proxy for educational attainment. For 
each occupation, the mean and standard deviation of all workers are computed and rounded 
up to the nearest certification level. Workers with educational attainment greater than the 
mean plus one standard deviation are labeled “overeducated”. Likewise, workers with 
educational attainment below the occupational mean minus one standard deviation are 
classified as “undereducated”. Workers whose educational attainment is within the mean plus 
or minus one standard deviation are considered “adequately matched”. Kiker et al. (1997) 
have modified this measure by using the mode instead of the mean as the mode is more 
sensitive to outliers. The latter modification is used in this study. This methodology was 
applied to Hong Kong (Ng, 2001), and both the US and Hong Kong (Cohn, Johnson and Ng, 
2000). 
Descriptive Summary 
Descriptive statistics of the sample reveal that by 2006, approximately 60% of all private 
sector workers worked in “craft and trade related work” and “services and shop related 
work”. “Plant and machine operations and assembly workers” comprised 15% of the 
distribution. The studied period has witnessed some drastic changes in occupational 
distribution; workers in the “technicians and associates” category increased by 95% (from 
3.6% to 6.9%). In contrast, the category of “legislators, senior officials, and managers” has 
lost 44% of its employment (from 2.2% to 1.2%). Plant machines operators and assembly 
workers, and elementary occupations have gained employment by 38% and 28% 
respectively. 
Figures (1-A) and (1-B) display the distribution of workers by their levels of education across 
occupations in the private sector for years 1998 and 2006, as well as their total distribution; 
and table (1) presents the incidence of mismatch in both years. The figures reveal that, in 
general, only secondary and university education graduates have increased between 1998 and 
2006 (by 26% and 20% respectively). While above secondary and beyond dominates high 
level occupations such as legislators, senior officials and professionals, by the nature of its 
requirements, secondary education and below lead to occupations such as clerks, service, 
plant and elementary occupations. These general characteristics mask inner differences. For 
example, in 1998, some 17% of all workers of occupational category “legislator, senior 
officials and managers” were secondary school graduates. 
In 2006, their size more than doubled to 37% (an increase of 111%). This may explain the 
increase in the percentage of the “undereducated” group in that category from 30% in 1998 to 
37% in 2006, as indicated in Table (1). Another substantial variation appears in the category 
of “technicians and associate professionals”, whereby university educated workers 
                                                                          
3 Hartog (2000) provided a review of measures of over, under and required education according to data 
availability: 1- Job Analysis (JA): evaluation by job analysts who determine the required level of education for a 
typical job or occupation; 2- Worker Self Assessment (WA): where the workers specify the required level of 
education for a typical job; 3- Realized Match (RM), where required education is obtained from the mean or the 
mode of education of all workers. 
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representing a mere 5% in 1998, escalated by over 300% to reach 22% of total workers in 
that category. This is also reflected by the rise in percentage of the “overeducated” from 8% 
to 22%. University graduates, as well, advanced their share in the category “craft and related 
trade workers” by over 200% (from 1% in 1998 to 3% in 2006). A puzzling outcome surfaces 
in this category. While in 1998 about 43% of its workers were classified as overeducated (and 
57% as adequately educated), it registered 30% of undereducated workers in 2006 (3% 
overeducated, 67% adequately educated). It is a puzzling conclusion because that 
occupational category witnessed a drop in primary, preparatory, as well as above secondary 
workers (by 27%, 32% and 50% respectively) at the expense of an increase in both secondary 
and university educated workers (by 46% and 200% respectively). An explanation for this is 
attempted later on. 
Turning to overall gender differences, descriptive statistics reveal that, in both years, females 
made up 12% of the workforce and males approximately 87%. About 73% of females in 1998 
worked in three main occupations: professionals (27%), services (25%) and crafts (21%). 
While these same categories accommodated 62% of females in 2006, the technicians and 
associate professionals category attracted 13%, compared to only 2% in 1998. As for males, 
76% were employed at three occupational categories with mild variations between 1998 and 
2006 —services (19%), crafts and related trade jobs (45%) and plant and machine operations 
(12%) in 1998 as compared to 24%, 36% and 16% respectively in 2006.   
Table (2) presents the incidence of mismatch by gender, for 1998 and 2006. On average, the 
table shows that the percentage of overeducated workers has dropped from 42% to 12% 
between 1998 and 2006, which is lower than the 40% reported for Mexican men by Quinn 
(2006). On the other hand, the economy witnessed an increase in the share of adequately 
educated workers from 49% to 58%, and an expansion in the share of undereducated from 
9% to 30%, which is comparable to that of Mexican men at 31% (Ibid). It appears that males 
are more likely to have educational mismatches, which is consistent with the findings of 
Groot (1996) for the UK,  McGoldrick and Robst (1996) for the USA, and Voon (2005) for 
Australia.  
It is important, when it comes to studying the relation between earnings and education to 
consider years of experience. The literature on human capital has documented the role of 
years of experience in workers’ earnings. Workers with more years of experience earn higher 
wages than workers with lower levels of experience. Interesting observations are revealed in 
Table 3, where the mismatch is reported by cohorts of years of experience.  
With a few exceptions, the table shows a negative relationship between over-education and 
years of experience, which also confirms the previous theoretical explanation that 
overeducated workers are compensated for lack of experience and on the job training. 
Conversely, undereducated workers have more years of experience. For example, in 1998, 
approximately 53% of male workers who had between one and five years of experience were 
overeducated (39% for females), and only 4% were undereducated (7% for females).  In 
2006, some 16% of male workers with one to five years of experience were overeducated 
(19% for women), and 17% were undereducated (11% for women). Comparing 1998 and 
2006, the incidence of the correct match for early entrants into the labor market (those with 
one to five years of experience) is noticeably higher in 2006 than in 1998 for both males and 
females (67% for males and 71% for females in 2006 vs. 43% and 54% respectively in 1998).   
These preliminary findings are consistent with the literature on the fact that labor market 
experience may substitute for formal education, especially for 1998. In fact, as Voon (2005) 
verified in the case of Australia, higher educated workers may voluntarily choose jobs that 
require lower levels of education in order to gain work experience. Meanwhile, 
undereducated workers are likely to swap low levels of education with more years of 
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experience.  Since the definition of required education might have changed in the eight year 
span as well as the demographics of the workers, and concurring with Quinn (2006), caution 
is advised while interpreting the changes in the incidence of mismatch from 1998 to 2006. 
For example, the recent literature on credentials or “sheep skin effect” may serve as a valid 
explanation for the drop in the percentage of overeducated vis a vis the increased percentage 
of undereducated in 2006. Firms may have increased hiring credentials while workers were 
seeking more education. In other words, younger workers may have obtained more education 
than the older generation in the hope of getting promoted, while older workers were left 
behind, showing up in the statistics as undereducated. This conclusion may explain the 
previous puzzle regarding workers in crafts and trade related occupations.  
Having provided a general portrayal of the sample, and in order to evaluate the development 
of the education-occupation mismatch in Egypt, it is useful to distinguish between 
traditionally higher paid, higher educated workers and lower paid, lower educated groups. 
One way is to group employment by occupation and economic activity into three broad 
categories: professional workers (i.e., legislators, managers, health professionals and 
educators); white-collar workers (i.e., technical assistance, clerks, sales and services) and 
blue-collar workers (i.e., vocational, production workers and others). The following analysis 
is run for males and females separately and for the three occupational categories: 
professionals, white collars, blue collars and others. 
Table (4) reports the incidence of mismatch by gender and occupational group. Care is 
advised when interpreting the numbers related to professional occupations. In general, 
professional occupations require advanced degrees that may top 18 years of education, thus 
creating a “ceiling”, where it is unexpected to find considerable number of mismatched 
workers. Recognizing that, educational mismatch is more applicable to occupations that 
require less than the pre-defined maximum level, such as white or blue collar workers. 
Furthermore, the distributional results of Table (4) show minimal incidences of overeducated 
professional workers (males or females). Hence, while the rest of the analysis reports results 
of professional occupations, discussions will be limited to white and blue collars only. 
Table (4) reveals blue collar jobs have adjusted quickly to changes in the market. Between 
1998 and 2006, adequately educated workers represented 53% and 63% for males and 
females respectively. The incidence of over-education in blue collar jobs has rapidly dropped 
for males and females alike (a drop by 91% and 94% respectively). In fact, since careers are 
limited at lower levels of occupations, over-education is less likely to be visible. Surprisingly, 
these jobs have attracted undereducated workers by greater numbers in 2006 compared to 
1998. The incidence of undereducated workers has gone up to represent 41% of males, and 
34% of females in blue collar jobs. Here, the credential argument may explain this change; 
employers raise their educational requirements, and while young workers come with higher 
levels of education, older workers, with lower levels of education, appear as undereducated. 
For white collars, aside from minimal fluctuation in the incidence of adequately educated 
workers, over-educated workers represented 27% of all white collar males in 2006 (and 30% 
for females), and while the incidence of undereducated white collar male workers has 
dropped by 30% from 1998 to 2006, female undereducated white collar workers have 
experienced a 52% increase during the same period. It seems that overeducated males in 
white collar jobs are forced to accept jobs below their qualifications, while undereducated 
women are given increased opportunities, probably because they may accept lower wages 
than undereducated men. The same destiny is faced by undereducated workers in blue collar 
jobs for males and females alike.  
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4. Empirical Findings4 
Table (5) shows estimated coefficients from running equation (3) for males and females using 
1998 and 2006 household surveys data. For brevity and because of the previously mentioned 
“ceiling” effect facing professionals, results on professionals are reported but not discussed. 
The adequately educated variable represents workers with matched certificates of education 
for their job, and the corresponding coefficient documents the returns to required certificate 
of education if adequately matched by the worker. The overeducated variable equals the 
difference between the worker’s actual certificate of education and the required certificate of 
education for that job. A positive coefficient for an overeducated worker with, say 12 years of 
education, in a job that requires 9 years of education indicates that he/she will earn more than 
a worker with the required level of education. Conversely, the undereducated variable 
represents the difference between the educational certificate required for the job and actual 
certificate of education. A negative sign for undereducated coefficients means that if a worker 
working in a job that requires, for example, secondary education (i.e. 12 years of education), 
a worker with 9 years of education will earn less than a worker with the required level of 
education.  
The table displays few significant coefficients for the education mismatch variables. 
However, when tested statistically, the coefficients on adequate, over and under-education 
differ significantly in all cases, for both genders and in both years. F-tests for the hypothesis 
that the years of adequate education, over-education and under-education should be rewarded 
equally, i.e. β1=β2=_β3, are all significant at least at the 5% level, implying that the 
assumption of equal rate of returns to adequate-, over and under-schooling, is rejected. 
Hence, it is somewhat safe to say that years of required education, years of over-education 
and years of under-education are not equally rewarded in the private employment economy. 
The table also shows that overeducated males in white collar jobs receive higher returns than 
adequately educated males in the same occupation, whereas undereducated males in the same 
occupation receive less. Moreover, returns to white collar jobs for males are better in 2006 
than in 1998 (i.e. overeducated workers earn more in 2006 than in 1998 — returns increased 
by 6 percentage points). For the undereducated, while still earning less than the adequately 
educated, the gap is lower in 2006 than in 1998 — i.e. returns decreased by 30 percentage 
points. A result that supports the argument that when employers are faced with an increased 
supply of overeducated candidates, they may be tempted to take advantage of them (in other 
words, employers favor overeducated workers to lower training costs). For white collar 
females, surprisingly, both over and under-education coefficients are positive and higher than 
the adequately educated group in 1998. A result that may reflect two competing arguments: 
first, an increased demand for women in low paying, white collar jobs — since they normally 
accept lower wages than males, and second, the labor market may have rewarded females’ 
years of experience at the expense of certification. This is supported by previous results (El-
Hamidi and Said, 2008), where certification and years of experience were treated differently 
by occupation and gender. Nevertheless, 2006 results matched those of males. Returns to 
over education were higher and returns to under-education were lower than adequately 
matched, though at a lower magnitude than those of men. Thus, there is evidence of a 
correction in the labor market regarding rewards for white collar females in 2006.  
Blue collar males experienced the same effect of white collar males — higher returns to over-
education and lower returns to under-education. Blue collar women, on the other hand, were 
                                                                          
4 The author acknowledges that the analysis ignores the potential bias that may be due to self-selection. One 
source of selectivity bias might be that persons with "over-education" might select themselves into specific 
occupations. Alternatively, people expecting low rent on inherited ability might invest more in education to 
increase the rental payment on acquired human capital. 
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penalized if they were inadequately matched, especially in 2006. Previous research (El-
Hamidi and Said, 2008) has documented that increased wage gaps between men and women 
in blue collar jobs has been attributed to pure discrimination in earnings due to concentration 
of women in low pay blue collar jobs, while men worked in high pay blue collar jobs, where 
their productivity related characteristics were treated according to market forces. The decline 
in returns to matched education for both gender and occupations seems to suggest that the 
demand for labor in these jobs has grown at a slower pace than the supply. 
As a result, the assumption that years of required, over and under-education are equally 
rewarded in the labor market is likely. Meanwhile, the assumption that productivity levels 
and wages are inflexible may now be rejected in the face of different returns to matched, over 
and under-education, for white and blue collar males and females. In fact, these findings 
support both the bumping model and job competition model in a labor market with an 
imperfect information system (Fields, 1972 and Thurow, 1975 respectively), whereby in the 
first model, the educated worker moves to the front of the queue of unskilled jobs and is hired 
first at the unskilled wage rate, “bumping” a less educated person from a job. In the second 
model, employers use education as a screening tool and an indicator of the cost of investing 
in job training by hiring overeducated workers in order to save on training costs. Meanwhile 
they may be unable or unwilling to utilize the extra education of the overeducated workers 
(Rumberger, 1987), when workers may accept these jobs while competing for a job.  
For the remainder of the coefficients, in general, residing in an urban area, as well as being 
married, affects wages positively (though coefficients are insignificant). Experience and 
experience squared both have the expected concave shape of increasing then diminishing 
returns. Finally, a large firm size (larger than 20 workers) has a positive influence on wages 
for white collar but not for blue collar workers.  
V. Policy Implications 
This study attempts to fill a void in the literature by examining education-occupation 
mismatches in Egypt. Using two surveys —  ELMS 98 and ELMPS 06 — this paper explores 
whether the empirical evidence of studies on over and under-education carry over to the 
Egyptian labor market in order to evaluate the incidence and magnitude of the education-
occupation mismatch by gender and by occupational categories and to determine whether the 
incidence of educational mismatches has increased over time.  
The main findings of this paper are as follows. The incidence of education-occupation 
mismatch has declined from 51% to 42% during the eight year period, and males are more 
likely to be mismatched than females.  The Egyptian labor market has witnessed a drop in the 
percentage of overeducated workers at the expense of an expansion in the share of 
undereducated workers.  
Empirical results of this study do not support the mainstream literature that overeducated 
workers receive lower returns than equally matched workers. In fact, empirical findings have 
indicated that returns to over-education for white collar and blue collar males are higher than 
those of adequately educated males and greater in 2006 than in 1998. This supports the 
argument that when employers are faced with an increased supply of overeducated candidates 
they may be tempted to take advantage of the more skilled having not yet raised the 
requirements of jobs that have been traditionally held by the less skilled. Females in white 
collar jobs, surprisingly, and for both over and undereducated workers, received higher 
returns than the adequately educated group in the first period. A result that my reflect two 
competing arguments: first, an increased demand for women in low paying, white collar jobs 
— since they normally accept lower wages than males, and second, and this is more 
applicable to undereducated women, the labor market may have rewarded years of experience 
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at the expense of certification. But evidence shows a reverse in this trend in 2006, where 
results mirrored that of males — i.e. returns to over-education were higher and returns to 
lower education were lower than the adequately matched, though at a lower magnitude. 
Females in blue collar jobs are penalized if they are inadequately matched, especially in 
2006, and are less rewarded than males, suggesting increased wage gaps between men and 
women in blue collar jobs. This has been attributed to the concentration of women in low pay 
blue collar jobs, while men work in high pay blue collar jobs, where their productivity related 
characteristics are rewarded according to market forces. 
To an extent, these results suggest that wages are not linked to required education. In other 
terms, in a given occupation, the returns to an additional year of required education is less 
than the returns from additional schooling of an overeducated worker (i.e. job requirements 
do not determine wages). This result also indicates that in order to raise the average wages, it 
is more efficient for optimizing current resources to increase educational attainments side by 
side with occupational levels and requirements. In fact, the greater the proportion of 
mismatched labor forces in the economy the greater the wage dispersion. Conventional 
wisdom suggests that increasing levels of education are expected to minimize earnings 
inequality (i.e. higher education reaps higher wages). Nevertheless, recent research Martins 
and Pereira (2004), Hartog, Pereira and Vieira (2001) for Portugal, and Gosling, Machin and 
Meghir (2000) for the UK, has shown that wage dispersion is wider between the more 
educated.  
The findings of this paper supports the job competition model in a labor market with an 
imperfect information system whereby employers use education as an indicator of the cost of 
investing in job training. Employers may hire overeducated workers in order to save on 
training costs, and they may be unable or unwilling to utilize the extra education of the 
overeducated workers. Workers, on the other hand, may accept these jobs while competing 
for another job. This is a significant finding suggesting that firms may not immediately react 
to changes in the supply side, as implied by the neoclassical theory. Several adverse effects 
may arise from education-occupation mismatch: firms may change their technology to adjust 
to current productivity levels, productivity may deteriorate and profits may decline in 
addition to lowering workers’ morals. 
The evidence of mismatched education found in this study reflects a structural mismatch 
between the job market and educational institutions. Policy makers should consider the 
source of over-education in the educational system not in the labor market. In many 
countries, graduates with marginal qualifications are voluntarily being forced to stay in the 
education system longer than they need to for limited job opportunities, and where surplus 
education is voluntarily, it is more often than not a result of society wide preference for 
education, and not a result of an investment decision based on rational expectations and 
potential future earnings. For policy makers, it is key to promote a mechanism for education 
screening that replaces the current system of personal contacts or connections in hiring 
workers, to foster proper labor market assignments and advance a transparent and effective 
labor market information system and to coordinate the rise in educational attainment with the 
higher occupational levels in order to efficiently maximize the use of economic resources. 
Policy makers may limit the supply of educated graduates by raising the private cost of a 
certain type of education, or impact the demand on a certain type of workers by offering tax 
credits for employing certain skill types, along with spreading career advice centers.  
A further investigation into the returns to actual level of schooling is needed for comparison 
and to concur with the literature. Studies have found that mismatched workers earn 
substantially lower rates of return to their education than their peers who found a job 
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matching their education. If this is the case, then educational expansion may augment wage 
inequality by increasing wage differences within equally educated workers. 
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Figure (1-B): Distribution of Occupations by Educational Levels, 2006 
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Table 1: The Incidence of Education-Occupation Mismatch 
1998 2006 Occupation Adequate Over Under Adequate Over Under 
Leg, Senior Offic, manag. 70 - 30 63 - 37 
Professionals 90 - 10 90 1 9 
Technic.& assoc., Prof. 89 8 3 72 22 5 
Clerks 70 22 8 64 27 8 
Serv.& shop/market sal. wrkrs 71 13 16 71 15 14 
Craft & related trad. wrkrs 57 43 - 67 3 30 
Plant & machine operat. & assemb. 62 3 36 70 2 28 
Elementary occupations 63 37 - 63 5 32 
Source: Author’s Estimates, ELMS 1998, and ELMPS 2006. 
 
Table 2: The Incidence of Educational Mismatch by Gender, 1998 and 2006 
1998 2006  
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Adequately Educated 48.16 55.07 48.96 57.12 65.41 58.12 
Over Educated 43.44 28.99 41.77 11.46 16.98 12.12 
Under Educated 8.40 15.94 9.27 31,42 17.61 29.76 
Source: Author’s Estimates, ELMS 1998, and ELMPS 2006 
 
Table 3: The Incidence of Educational Mismatch by Years of Experience and Gender, 
1998 and 2006 
1998 2006 Years of 
Experience Adeq. 
Educated 
Over 
Educated 
Under 
Educated 
Adeq. 
Educated 
Over 
Educated 
Under  
Educated 
Males       
1-5 43.20 52.80 4.00 66.91 16.25 16.82 
6-10 44.75 47.86 7.39 66.28 12.60 21.11 
11-20 50.60 38.86 10.54 51.72 8.86 39.42 
20-30 57.52 33.63 8.85 38.39 5.69 55.92 
30+ 56.32 27.59 16.09 30.37 6.67 62.96 
Females       
1-5 53.70 38.89 7.41 70.54 18.75 10.71 
6-10 68.75 25.00 6.25 60.23 21.59 18.18 
11-20 36.00 24.00 40.00 68.52 9.26 22.22 
20-30 75.00 0.00 25.00 52.17 4.35 43.48 
30+ 44.44 22.22 33.33 63.64 13.64 22.73 
Source: Author’s estimates, ELMS 1998, and ELMPS 2006 
 
Table 4: The Incidence of Mismatch by Occupational Groups and Gender, 1998 and 
2006 
 1998 2006 
Males Professionals White Collars Blue Collars Professionals White Collars Blue Collars 
Adequately Educated 77.36 54.58 40.28 86.6 56.01 53.32 
Over-Educated 3.77 21.12 59.72 0.48 26.87 5.37 
Under-Educated 18.87 24.3 0 12.92 17.11 41.3 
Females       
Adequately Educated 65.79 58.62 45.45 86.08 56.55 63.38 
Over-Educated 0 32.76 54.55 1.27 30.36 2.82 
Under-Educated 34.21 8.62 0 12.66 13.1 33.8 
Soruce: Author’s estimates, and ELMS 1998. ELMPS 2006 
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Table 5: Estimates of Regression Coefficients of Log Real Hourly Wages by 
Occupational Categories and Gender, 1998 and 2006 
Variables 1998 2006 
Males Professionals White Collars Blue Collars Professionals White Collars Blue Collars 
Adequately 
educated 
0.0004 0.007 0.020 0.059* 0.001 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.030) (0.010) (0.007) 
Over Educated 0.470*** 0.067 0.010 0.462* 0.073* 0.053 
 (0.172) (0.050) (0.016) (0.246) (0.038) (0.032) 
Under educated 0.003 -0.057 0.000 0.196 -0.026 -0.019 
 (0.0055) (0.044) (0.000) (0.168) (0.023) (0.014) 
Experience 0.030 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.033 0.035*** 0.017*** 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.007) (0.020) (0.009) (0.006) 
Experience-Sq. -0.056 -0.042 -0.067*** -0.074* -0.045** -0.012 
 (0.062) (0.032) (0.016) (0.045) (0.021) (0.011) 
Married (0= 
not married) 
0.044 0.166 0.019 0.218 0.191*** 0.109*** 
 (0.181) (0.109) (0.056) (0.164) (0.069) (0.038) 
Urban (0=rural) -0.217 -0.102 -0.067 -0.004 -0.099* -0.055* 
 (0.199) (0.101) (0.046) (0.200) (0.051) (0.030) 
Firm Size 
(0=LT 20) 
0.441* ** 0.214*** -0.094** 0.299** 0.246*** -0.065* 
 (0.154) (0.076) (0.043) (0.140) (0.052) (0.035) 
Constant 0.383 0.018 0.150 -0.239 0.044 0.488*** 
 (0.323) (0.204) (0.104) (0.488) (0.127) (0.087) 
Observations 135 269 644 208 699 1398 
R-squared 0.207 0.263 0.169 0.106 0.210 0.073 
 19
Table 5 (continued) 
Variables 1998 2006 
Females Professionals White Collars Blue Collars Professionals White Collars Blue Collars 
Adequately 
educated 
0.009 0.117*** 0.098 0.018 0.007 0.073 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.106) (0.027) (0.028) (0.049) 
Over 
Educated 
0.000 0.585*** 0.181** 0.095 0.048 -0.196 
 (0.000) (0.106) (0.080) (0.278) (0.098) (0.199) 
Under 
educated 
-0.034 0.280*** 0.000 -0.106 -0.043 -0.162 
 (0.158) (0.084) (0.000) (0.095) (0.092) (0.121) 
Experience 0.018 -0.006 0.062 0.047 0.049 0.031 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.058) (0.043) (0.033) (0.057) 
Experience-
Sq. 
-0.070 0.109 -0.106 -0.059 -0.005 -0.018 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.124) (0.123) (0.149) (0.171) 
Married (0= 
not married) 
0.140 0.933*** 0.161 0.005 0.221 0.896* 
 (0.317) (0.324) (0.671) (0.191) (0.211) (0.518) 
Urban 
(0=rural) 
-0.897** -0.097 -0.116 -0.296 0.034 0.247 
 (0.341) (0.217) (0.283) (0.311) (0.201) (0.306) 
Firm Size 
(0=LT 20) 
0.897** 0.521*** -0.008 0.157 0.442** -0.017 
 (0.403) (0.151) (0.472) (0.258) (0.171) (0.250) 
Constant -0.010 -1.839*** -1.204* 0.167 -0.505 0.625 
 (0.495) (0.382) (0.702) (0.684) (0.356) (0.628) 
Observations 41 63 31 77 160 68 
R-squared 0.254 0.766 0.300 0.185 0.226 0.225 
 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Author’s Estimates, ELMS 1998, and ELMPS 2006 
